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Abstract. 
This study aims to investigate the influences of political connection on stock returns in 
Indonesia. We develop a comprehensive database of firm-level political connectedness 
among Indonesian firms from 2010 to 2017. Our sample is non-financial Indonesian listed 
firms that are selected in the Kompas 100 index for 16 consecutive periods, with a total 
of 448 firm-year observations. This study employs panel data regressions to estimate this 
relationship, then mitigate possible endogeneity issues using two-stage least square with 
fixed-effects. The finding of this study shows that political connectedness is associated 
with lower stock returns, more prominently in agriculture and consumer goods industries. 
Moreover, state-owned enterprises are more likely to earn lower stock returns. In 
summary, our result suggests that investing in politically connected firms could be a risky 
investment. The finding holds using alternative estimation methods.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 The financial crisis has significant impacts on economic conditions. For example, 
the 2008 Global Financial Crisis affects most major economies in Asia and Europe, no 
exception in Indonesia. This crisis affects not only the housing market, but also economic 
productivity, unemployment, and asset prices. As explained by Reinhart & Rogoff (2009) 
in The Aftermath of Financial Crises, a sharp inclination of default and declined in output 
production growth occurred in emerging countries, for two consecutive years after crises. 
Particularly in Indonesia, the economic growth drops around 4% during the crisis, 
as exports weakened and the downturn in security prices (Bank Indonesia, 2009). Due to 
lots of uncertainty, foreign capital outflows in the Indonesian stock market sharply 
increase as the investors reactively move out their capital to less risky places. 
This sound effects of the financial crisis in real economy sectors and equity market 
stimulating the investors to find a way to predict the market so that they able to mitigate 
capital loss. This study aims to help the investors by investigating the determinant of stock 
returns in Indonesia, using the least explored capital, namely political connectedness. We 
investigate this issue because the political risk in Indonesia highly intervenes stock market 
returns (Amtiran & Indiastuti, 2017). Previous study suggests that having a good 
connection with politicians is a valuable capital for the firms (Ling, Zhou, Liang, Song, 
& Zeng, 2016).  
 74 
 
               Jurnal Perspektif Pembiayaan dan Pembangunan Daerah Vol. 7 No. 1, July – August 2019   ISSN: 2338-4603 (print); 2355-8520 (online) 
 
We formulate the estimation models by developing testable political capital 
hypotheses used in Civilize & Young (2015) and Hahn & Lee (2009). We extend the 
study using more comprehensive measures of political connectedness, examining the 
connection of each board of director and board of commissioner. The evidence of this 
study is robust under different estimation methods and models. 
We examine this linkage using Indonesian data. The reasons are; first, Indonesia 
has failed to impress Transparency International organization, due to the constant high 
level of corruption occurred in this country. Currently, Indonesia corruption index ranks 
number 90 out a total of 181 countries (Transparency International, 2018). Due to the fact 
that the sentiment is negative in the high level of corruption countries (Bathia & Goyal, 
2013), the risk of investing in Indonesian stock markets is more pronounced. Therefore, 
we want to provide suggestions to investors in such a high-risk market setting. Second, 
according to Faccio (2006), political connection ubiquitously exploited in the country 
with high level of corruption, foreign investment restrictions and more transparent 
system. In fact, Indonesia fulfills those criteria, indicating the importance role of political 
connection in this country. Therefore, we attempt to address the influence of political ties 
on stock returns in Indonesia. As best to author’s knowledge, this is the first study that 
examines this linkage using Indonesian data for a period of 2010 to 2017. 
Research examining the determinant of stock returns in Indonesia suggest that 
macroeconomic conditions influence stock market performances. Inflation, exchange 
rate, interest rate, and bond yields affect stock returns (Defrizal, Sucherly, Wirasasmita, 
& Nidar, 2015). Furthermore, unique firm characteristics also play an important role in 
stock market performances. In the traditional model, stock returns are explained by these 
firm characteristics, i.e., firm size, book-to-market, debt ratio, and E/P ratio (Fama & 
French, 1992). Prior studies found that in Indonesia, firm size and debt ratio have a 
positive association with stock returns (Fauzi & Wahyudi, 2016). Also, liquidity ratio and 
market ratio have negative effects on stock returns in Indonesian markets (Fauzi & 
Wahyudi, 2016; Martani, Mulyono & Khairurizka, 2009). Therefore, we account for these 
firm characteristics in our estimation model. 
Without neglecting these factors, the impact of political connectedness on stock 
returns has been tested using various methods (Chen, Ariff, Hassan, & Mohamad, 2014; 
Ferris, Houston, & Javakhadze, 2016; Fisman, 2001; Leuz & Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Wu, 
Wu, & Rui, 2012 among others). Fisman (2001) uses an event study analysis to estimate 
the value of political connection in Indonesia. He found that the stock returns of politically 
connected firms highly depend on politicians’ performances. Hahn & Lee (2009) find 
positive influences of political connection on stock returns because such firms are more 
likely to be assisted in bank loans access and regulation bureaucracies. However, Ling, 
Zhou, Liang, Song, & Zeng (2016) argue that the existence of politicians in the board 
members increase firm investment risks as they tend to overinvest the assets, which 
caused a sharp decline in firm performances. Chen, Li, Su, & Sun (2011) explain that 
politicians often utilize their power for rent-seeking, consistent with Shleifer & Vishny 
(1994) that suggest politicians focally point their best interests. Therefore, politically 
connected firms are less efficient, as government distorts firms’ investment behaviour (S. 
Chen, Sun, Tang, & Wu, 2011).  
Also, politically connected firms are associated with poorer corporate governance, 
due to lower quality information disclosure that caused by ineffectiveness of internal and 
external monitoring (Chaney, Faccio, & Parsley, 2011). With this regard, the markets 
punish political stocks. Using the sample of India, Ghosh (2011) shows that firms with 
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political connection earn lower stock returns compared to non-connected firms. 
Moreover, the liquidity of stocks is also disrupted (Ding, 2014). Hence, we develop the 
hypothesis as follow. 
H1: Political connection has a negative impact on stock returns 
This study contributes to the discussion regarding stock returns determinants, by 
reporting a significant association between political connectedness and stock returns  
(Addoum & Kumar, 2016; Civilize & Young, 2015; Fama & French, 1992; Hahn & Lee, 
2009 among others). Our study also accompanies the discussion regarding political 
connection influences on firm value and performances (Cao, Huang, Liu, & Tian, 2012; 
Fisman, 2001; Su & Fung, 2013; Wu, Wu, & Rui, 2012 among others). Also, our finding 
has practical contributions. By acknowledging the factors that determine stock returns, 
the investors able to formulate better investment decisions. Our study helps them in 
avoiding capital loss. 
The structure of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 is introduction, which 
describes the background of this research. Section 2 explains the data collection and 
research methods. Section 3 presents the result of the data analysis. Last, section 4 
concludes the paper. 
 
METHODS 
The population of this research is all listed firms in Indonesian Stock Exchange 
from 2010 to 2017. We employ a purposive sampling method and use Indonesian listed 
firms that are selected in the Kompas 100 index for 16 consecutive periods, from 2010 to 
2017 with total observations of 448 firm-year data. We exclude financial firms due to 
different behaviour and financial reporting. Stock returns and firm characteristics data are 
obtained from The Indonesian Capital Market Institute (TICMI) databases. For political 
connection, we hand-collect the data from boards’ resumes disclosed in the annual reports 
and firms’ websites. Last, we collect Indonesian 10-Year bond yields from investing.com 
databases. This study uses panel data regressions to investigate the effect of political 
connection on stock returns, adopting the employed model in Civilize & Young (2015) 
as follow: 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ………………………………………………… (1) 
Where 𝑟𝑖𝑡 denotes the log return of firm i year t. 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 denotes 
political connectedness of firm i year t, consists of polscoreit for political connection score 
of firm i year t, pSOEit for state-owned enterprises dummy of firm i year t, and pNSOEit 
for politically connected non-state owned enterprises of firm i year t. To calculate political 
connection score (polscore), we follow Boubakri, Cosset, & Saffar (2008) that calculates 
the ratio between connected board members to total board members on the firm. We 
define connected board members following Faccio (2006), if  one of its top executives is 
a member/former of parliament, military, ministry, regent, or have served governmental 
organizations. White (1980) robust standard error is employed to account 
heteroskedasticity, serial correlation, and non-normality dispersions that may violate the 
estimation results. 
Since stock risks are multidimensional, we adopt Fama & French (1992)’s 
multivariate analysis to determine the explanatory factors of stock returns. The following 
model is employed to test the effect of political connection on stock returns, with several 
control variables. 
 76 
 
               Jurnal Perspektif Pembiayaan dan Pembangunan Daerah Vol. 7 No. 1, July – August 2019   ISSN: 2338-4603 (print); 2355-8520 (online) 
 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽5𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 …………………….………… (2) 
Where 𝑟𝑖𝑡 denotes the log return of firm i at year t. Polscore denotes political 
connectedness of firm i at year t. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets of firm i at 
year t, to proxy firm size. BTM is book value of equity to market capitalizations of firm i 
at year t, to account for firm’s growth opportunity. Solvency denotes total assets to total 
liabilities of firm i at year t, to account for solvency. LiqRatio denotes current assets to 
current liabilities of firm i at year t, to account firm’s liquidity. BEP is operating profits 
to total assets of firm i at year t, to account basic earning power ratio. Last, BondYields 
denotes Indonesian 10-Year bond yields, to account for undiversifiable risks occurred in 
the market. 
In the first part of our analysis, we use pooled regressions to estimate the models 
using industry and time controls to account each industry’s unique feature and change in 
economic conditions. To check the robustness, in the second part of our analysis, we use 
panel data fixed effect regressions and two-stage least square regressions, to account 
endogeneity problem that may exist in our models. This work uses ratio of politically 
connected board of directors to total board of directors of firm i at year t (pBOD) as an 
alternative instrument of polscore in 2SLS regressions. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Summary Statistics 
Table 1 reports summary statistics for political connection variables. Panel A 
provides a proportion of politically connected firms by industry, from a sample of 
Indonesian listed firms that are selected in Kompas 100 index for 16 consecutive periods, 
from 2010 to 2017. Panel B reports total observations, mean, standard deviation, 
minimum value and maximum value of political connection variables used in this 
research from the total sample. 
Table 1. Summary statistics of political connection variables 
Panel A: Proportion of politically connected firms by industry 
 
Number 
of firms 
Number of 
connected firms 
Percentage of 
connected firms 
All firms 448 280 63 
Industries:    
Agriculture 40 24 60 
Basic Industry and Chemicals 40 32 80 
Consumer Good 32 24 75 
Trade and Services 16 10 63 
Infrastructure, Utilities, & Transportation 48 20 42 
Mining 128 78 61 
Miscellanous 56 40 71 
Property, Real Estate, & Construction 88 52 59 
Panel B: Statistics of political connection variables 
 Number of obs. Mean Std. Dev Minimum Maximum 
Polscore 445 0.4844 0.6601 0 2 
pBOD 448 0.0204 0.0617 0 0.2857 
pSOE 448 0.2841 0.3144 0 1 
pNSOE 448 0.1786 0.3834 0 1 
Source: Author’s calculation 
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From Panel A of Table 1, we find 63% of Indonesian listed firms that are selected 
in Kompas 100 index for eight consecutive years from 2010 to 2017 are connected to 
politicians or government officials. Moreover, Basic Industry and Chemicals dominate 
political connection data set as 80% of the sample from this industry is politically 
connected. In fact, Basic Industry and Chemicals is the top contributor to Indonesian 
unemployment and GDP (Ministry of Industry Republic of Indonesia, 2012). Therefore, 
this industry is more controlled by politicians or government officials to ensure economic 
stability. 
Panel B shows the summary statistics of all political connection variables from the 
total sample. The mean of political connection score (polscore) on our sample is 48.44%, 
meaning that, on average, the board members or a majority of the shareholders of the 
firms in our sample are connected to the politicians or government officials, with standard 
deviations of 0.6601. Also, in average, 2.04% of the board of directors of the firms in our 
sample are politically connected with maximum score of 28.57%. 
Furthermore, we provide summary statistics of firm characteristic variables in Table 
2. Panel A reports the total observations, mean, standard deviations, minimum value, and 
maximum value for total sample. To understand whether the characteristics of politically 
connected and non-connected firms are different, we provide the summary statistics for a 
sample of politically connected firms in Panel B and summary statistics of non-politically 
connected firms in Panel C. 
Table 2. Summary statistics of firm characteristic variables 
Panel A: Total observations 
 Obs Mean Std. dev Minimum Maximum 
Size 448 14.838 8.882 7.281 32.997 
BTM 448 0.699 0.797 -0.386 6.983 
Solvency 448 1.717 1.387 0.133 7.515 
LiqRatio 448 2.189 1.592 0.345 10.642 
BEP 448 0.113 0.127 -0.301 0.618 
Panel B: Politically connected firms 
  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Size 280 14.787 8.809 7.281 32.483 
BTM 280 0.746 0.907 -0.386 6.983 
Solvency 280 1.668 1.269 0.151 6.104 
LiqRatio 280 2.183 1.623 0.345 10.642 
BEP 280 0.107 0.125 -0.301 0.618 
Panel C: Non-politically connected firms 
  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Size 168 14.923 9.028 7.515 32.997 
BTM 168 0.623 0.570 0.012 3.533 
Solvency 168 1.798 1.564 0.133 7.515 
LiqRatio 168 2.199 1.547 0.388 7.461 
BEP 168 0.123 0.130 -0.287 0.538 
Source: Author’s calculation 
From Panel A of Table 2, we see that the firm size of non-connected firms is higher 
than connected firms and total sample. The average value of Size for non-connected firms 
is 14.923 (deviation of 9.028), while Size of connected firms and total sample are 14.787 
(deviation of 8.809) and 14.838 (deviation of 8.882), respectively. For BTM, we find that 
the ratio between book value of equity to market value of equity for connected firms are 
higher. The average value of BTM for connected firms is 74.6% (deviation of 0.907), 
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while for non-connected and total sample are 62.3% (deviation of 0.57) and 69.9% 
(deviation of 0.797), respectively. It means that non-connected firms are relatively 
overpriced compared to connected firms, indicating lower market growth opportunity. 
Furthermore, the ratio of total assets to total liabilities (Solvency) of non-connected 
firms is higher. The average value of Solvency for non-connected firms is 1.798 (deviation 
of 1.564), meaning that such firms are relatively more solvent due to lower debt ratio. On 
the other hand, connected firms own higher debt ratio because such firms have more 
access to finance, consequently it becomes less solvent  (Claessens, Feijen, & Laeven, 
2008; Yeh, Shu, & Chiu, 2013). Similarly, current ratio (LiqRatio) of non-connected 
firms is higher because the curent liabilities of non-connected firms is lower. 
Interestingly, connected firms have less basic earning power because the ratio 
between operating profits to total assets (BEP) is lower. The average value of BEP on 
connected firms is 10.7% (deviation of 0.125), while BEP on non-connected firms is 
12.3% (deviation of 0.130). It means that connected firms are less efficient in utilising 
the total assets compared to non-connected firms. This inefficiency may occur due to rent-
seeking activities from government officials that often occurred on connected firms Chen, 
Li, Su & Sun 2011). After the data distribution of variables used in this study is identified, 
we conduct a Pairwise Correlation test to ensure that our estimation models examining 
the influence of political connection on stock returns contain no multicollinearity 
problems. 
Table 3. Pairwise correlation 
  polscore Size BTM Solvency LiqRatio BEP BondYield 
Polscore 1             
Size 0.011 1           
BTM -0.026 -0.0664 1         
Solvency -0.088* -0.51*** -0.020 1       
LiqRatio -0.047 -0.0078 -0.061 0.25*** 1     
BEP -0.083* 0.0715 -0.35*** -0.016 0.106** 1   
BondYield -0.008 -0.346*** -0.038 0.337*** -0.061 -0.11** 1 
***, **, * indicate statitical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 To provide unbiased estimation results, we use independent variables that 
correlated below 60% (Huang & Zhao, 2016). The result of Pairwise Correlation tests 
presented in Table 3 shows that our models contain no multicollinearity problems because 
the correlation matrix does not exceed 60%. After that, we conduct Breusch-Pagan 
Lagrange Multiplier, and Haussmann tests to decide the estimator of our models. The 
result shows that pooled OLS regressions fit our data set because it meets the best linear 
unbiased estimator (BLUE) conditions. 
Estimation results 
We provide the results of our estimation models in Table 4, using pooled OLS 
regressions. Panel A shows the estimated coefficient of political connection score 
(polscore) to stock returns. In Panel B, following Lin, Tan, Zhao, & Karim (2015), we 
separate the political connectedness under different types of ownership, i.e. state-owned 
enterprises (pSOE) and non-state-owned enterprises (pNSOE) to understand where the 
value of political connectedness occurred. We also provide the result of two sample mean-
comparison test to ensure that the independent variables used in the model are statistically 
different, in order to avoid multicollinearity issue.  
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Table 4. Stock returns under different type of connection 
Panel A: Overall political connection 
 Coefficient t-stat 
Polscore -0.023 (-1.80)* 
Cons 0.048 (4.06)*** 
Obs 434  
R-Squared 0.0059  
Panel B: Based on different type of ownership structure 
 Coefficient t-stat  Differences t-stat 
pSOE -0.041 (-1.70)* β1 - β2 = 0 -0.268 (-7.61)*** 
pNSOE -0.020 (-0.94)    
Cons 0.055 (3.63)    
Obs 437     
R-squared 0.0055     
***, **, * indicate statitical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Source: Author’s calculation 
Reported in Panel A of Table 4, stock returns for politically connected firms are 
significantly lower than non-connected firms. The polscore coefficient suggests that 
when firms tying closer connection to the politicians or government official, the average 
stock returns of the firms decrease 2.3% per year (statistically significant at 10%). 
Another significant variable is state-owned enterprises dummy (pSOE) that shows such 
firms earn lower average stock return of 4.1% per year (statistically significant at 10%) 
compared to average stock returns of non-SOEs. Previous study shows that the officials 
intervene connected firms for rent-seeking, resulting in lower firm performances 
(Acemoglu & Johnson, 2014). This exploitation is cutting the profit pie that initially 
distributed to the investors. Indeed, our result confirms the evidence in China that shows 
political rent-seeking is associated with negative stock returns (Fan, Rui, & Zhao, 2008). 
To ensure that the evidence is not caused by other factors that also explain stock 
returns in Indonesia, we further run the regressions with control variables. We use pooled 
OLS regressions to estimate the relationship, using the robust standard error to account 
heterokesticity and non-normality dispersions (White, 1980). We run three models to 
estimate this relationship; model 1 does not account industry and time effects. Model 2 
accounts time effect, and model 3 accounts industry effect. Other variables used are 
similar, as presented in Table 5. 
Table 5. Stock returns and political connection with control variables 
  OLS (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) 
  Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat 
Polscore -0.028      -1.72*  -0.018    -1.70* -0.006     -0.44 
Size 0.007       4.83*** -0.012    -1.38 0.007       5.29*** 
BTM -0.048      -1.98** -0.040    -1.89* -0.051      -2.11** 
Leverage 0.002       0.28 -0.003    -0.45 0.006       0.87 
LiqRatio -0.006     -1.44 -0.007    -1.34 -0.008      -1.61 
BEP 0.223       2.41** 0.163      1.83** 0.214       2.25** 
BondYields -0.109      -3.15*** -0.358     -6.00*** -0.115      -3.28*** 
Cons -0.039      -0.96 0.052      0.49 -0.013      -0.28 
Industry Control No  No  Yes  
Time Control No  Yes  No  
Obs 434  434  434  
R-squared 0.2238  0.3570  0.2495  
***, **, * indicate statitical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Source: Author’s calculation 
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After controlling for firm characteristics, the results confirm the negative 
relationship between political connection and stock returns in Indonesia. Table 5 shows 
political connectedness (polscore), firm size (Size), book-to-market (BTM), basic earning 
power (BEP), and bond yields (BondYields) determine stock returns in Indonesian 
market. In model 1, we see that one-unit standard deviation of political connection score 
decrease 2.8% average stock returns (statistically significant at 10%). Furthermore, when 
the variance of time effects is controlled, the magnitude of political connectedness 
influence on stock returns decrease 1% to 1.8%. However, the estimated coefficient of 
political connectedness (polscore) in model 3 become insignificant when we control for 
industry effect. Therefore, we further estimate this association within each industry to see 
where this effect is mediated. 
For the influence of firm characteristics on stock returns, Table 5 shows larger firms 
tend to gain higher stock returns per year. We find one-unit increase in firm size increase 
0.7% stock returns per year. We also find negative relationship between book-to-market 
(BTM) to stock returns, where one-unit increase in BTM decreases 4.8% stock returns. 
The result consistents with Hahn & Lee (2009) and Fama & French (1992) that found 
financially unconstrained firms (proxied by Size and BTM) have been predicted earning 
higher stock returns. 
Similarly, the ratio between operating income to total assets (BEP) have positive 
and significant association with stock returns, consistent with Civilize & Young (2015). 
We find one-unit change in basic earning power increases 22.3% of stock returns per year. 
Moreover, Indonesian 10-Year Bond Yields is negatively associated with stock returns 
since bond is naturally an alternative investment choice for stock market. We see one-
unit change in BondYields decreases 10.9% stock returns, and this finding is consistent 
with Glascock, Lu, & So (2000). 
After the effects of political connectedness and firm characteristics are examined, 
we further analyze this association within each industry to understand the magnitude of 
this impact within each sector. We use fixed effect panel data regressions to estimate the 
models, with time effects to account for the variance of economic change conditions 
across time. The estimation results are reported in Table 6. 
Table 6. Stock returns within each industry 
 
Agri-   
culture 
Basic 
Industry & 
Chemicals 
Consumer 
Goods 
Trade 
and 
Services 
Infrastructure, 
Utilities & 
Transportation 
Mining 
Miscella-
nous 
Property, Real 
Estate & 
Construction 
polscore   -0.233* 0.188 -1.446** 6.445   -0.036 0.054      0.134  -0.174 
  (-1.82) (1.54) (-2.35) (0.14)   (-0.07) (0.34)      (0.29)  (-1.04) 
Size   -0.179* 0.315 -0.344 2.946   -0.219 0.037     -0.108  -0.175 
  (-1.90) (1.60) (-1.09) (0.06)   (-1.16) (0.77)     (-0.70)  (-1.60) 
BTM   -0.129** -0.02 -1.847*** 1.576    -0.332*** -0.103***      -0.239**  -0.039 
  (-2.34) (-0.20) (-3.30) (0.12)   (-5.27) (-2.64)     (-2.20)  (-1.48) 
Leverage  -0.031 -0.029 -0.015 -0.132   -0.034 -0.021      0.077    0.005 
 (-1.47) (-0.85) (-0.51) (-0.12)   (-1.59) (-0.53)     (0.88)   (0.21) 
LiqRatio   0.006 0.027 -0.0265 0.588     0.073 -0.012    -0.039    0.005** 
   (0.20) (1.53) (-0.42) (0.30)    (1.25) (-0.56)    (-1.24)   (0.72) 
BEP   0.158 0.585**  1.507** -31.421   -0.387   0.443      0.598    1.290*** 
   (0.57) (2.65) (2.49) (-0.27)  (-1.36)  (1.44)     (0.73)   (4.09) 
Cons    2.031** -3.593* 5.163 -37.934    2.451 -0.269      1.101    1.472 
   (2.06) (-1.77) (1.58) (-0.06)   (1.25) (-0.55)     (0.64)    (1.46) 
Time Control     Yes   Yes   Yes Yes     Yes    Yes       Yes       Yes 
Obs        38       40       32 16        47     118         55         88 
R-Squared 0.2483 0.3721 0.3799 0.0249 0.3434 0.5027  0.2767  0.2099 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 81 
 
               Jurnal Perspektif Pembiayaan dan Pembangunan Daerah Vol. 7 No. 1, July – August 2019   ISSN: 2338-4603 (print); 2355-8520 (online) 
 
From table 6, we see that political connection influences occurred on specific 
industries. This study finds political connectedness in Indonesia matters in Agriculture 
and Consumer Goods sectors. The estimated coefficient of political connectedness 
(polscore) is negative and significant in Model 1, meaning that one-unit change of 
political connection score of firms in Agriculture industry decrease 23.3% its average 
stock returns. Similarly, the estimated coefficient of political connection score (polscore) 
in model 3 is also negative and significant. For one-unit change in political connection 
score of firms in Consumer Goods industry, decreases 144.6% stock returns per year. To 
deliver robust evidence for the link between political connection and stock returns, we 
estimate the models using different methods. First, using fixed effect panel data 
regression to account for inconsistency of our data set. Second, using two-stage least 
square with fixed effects, the models account for endogeneity issue that may violate our 
regressions. We use political connection score of board of directors (pBOD) as an 
alternative measure of polscore. The result is presented in Table 7. 
Table 7 shows consistent results for the link between political connectedness and 
stock returns. In model 1, we see that one-unit change of political connection score 
(polscore) decreases 25.2% stock returns per year. Similarly, using instrument variable 
of political connectedness of firm’s board of directors, we find 56.6% average stock 
returns decrease as if board of directors become more connected to political party. In 
summary, it can be concluded that investors in Indonesia see political connectedness as a 
negative value. 
For control variables, the result consistents with our main models. Larger firm 
(Size), low book-to-market (BTM), and high earning ratio (BEP) are positively influence 
stock returns. Furthermore, using fixed effect panel data regression and two-stage least 
square regression, we find other characteristics determine stock returns in Indonesia. Firm 
with higher assets to liabilities ratio (Solvency) is associated with positive returns because 
such firms are less likely to be financially distressed. 
Table 7. Political connection and stock returns using different estimation methods 
  OLS Fixed Effect (1) 2SLS Fixed Effect (2) 
  First Stage Second Stage 
  Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat 
polscore -0.252 (-2.77)***   -0.566 (-3.37)*** 
pBOD   -1.199 (-3.45)***   
Size 0.006 (5.71)*** 0.008 (6.06)*** 0.007 (5.50)*** 
BTM -0.117 (6.56)*** -0.116 (-6.53)*** -0.116 (-6.40)*** 
Solvency 0.020 (2.16)** 0.020 (2.17)** 0.023 (2.38)** 
LiqRatio -0.031 (-3.10)*** -0.024 (-2.48)** -0.038 (-3.56)*** 
BEP 0.558 (3.00)*** 0.539 (4.28)*** 0.605 (4.62)*** 
BondYield -0.148 (-3.80)*** -0.384 (-3.68)*** -0.158 (-3.97)*** 
Cons 0.975  (1.50) -0.020  (-0.44) 0.258 (2.64)*** 
Obs 417  417  417  
R-Squared 0.2561  0.1589  0.2911  
Source: Author’s calculation 
In summary, this work exploits an alternative determinant of stock returns in 
Indonesia using the least discussed factor, namely political connectedness. We find 
political connectedness determine stock returns, more prominently in Agriculture and 
Consumer Goods industries. The association between political connectedness and stock 
returns is negative due to rent-seeking behavior that is perceived negatively by the 
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investors (Chen, Li, Su & Sun, 2011). Rent-seeking behavior that commonly occurred in 
connected firms decrease firm performances and wealth distribution, hence the investors 
in Indonesia prefer to avoid these firms. 
The finding of this study suggests that the presence of politicians in the board 
members cause negative sentiment in Indonesian stock markets. The politicians may 
exploit the company’s profit for 2014 general election campaign and political party 
operations. Therefore, when politicians or government officials enter the company as the 
board member, the investors perceive that such agents will confiscate their wealth. With 
this regard, the stock price of such firms will befall. Our finding explains this 
phenomenon by demonstrating political connectedness statistically significant decreasing 
firm’s stock returns using various methods. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Conclusions 
This study reports political connectedness determines stock returns in Indonesia. 
We find the existence of a politically connected board of directors or board of 
commissioners influence negatively to stock returns, more prominently in Agriculture 
and Consumer Goods sectors. Also, state-owned enterprises are more likely to gain lower 
returns compared to privately-owned enterprises. Prior literature explains that politicians 
often exploit the profit earned for rent-seeking that cause investors distrust. This study 
also find larger firms, low book-to-market, more solvent, more earning power, and liquid 
firms are more likely to gain high stock returns. The results hold under different 
alternative methods.  
Recommendations 
This study has several limitations. First, political connection data is compiled using 
all available information disclosed in boards’ resume, and neglect unobserved aspect of 
connection, such as personal relationship with the political party that might also important 
on explaining political connection power. Second, this study does not examine the link 
between political connection and rent-seeking directly. Therefore, we suggest further 
research to test the direct relationship between political connection and rent-seeking in 
Indonesia, to deliver empirical explanations regarding negative effects of political 
connection on stock returns. 
Nevertheless, the finding of this study is important for investors. By understanding 
the determinants of stock returns presented in this research, we help the investors on 
optimizing their investment decisions. Our results suggest the investors consider political 
connectedness of the board members, prominently in Agriculture and Consumer Goods 
sectors. 
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